Georges Politzer’s Elementary Principles of Philosophy
He’s definitely mixing things up, so I’m not surprised you mix them too… he’s even involving a “God”, as if this had anything to do with religion. He even talks about a “soul”…
There are theists who are hard materialists (eg. Thomas Hobbes), and there are atheists who are hard idealists (eg. Bernardo Kastrup). It’s also possible be atheist and believe in a soul (eg. Michael Humer) or theist and believe there is no soul (eg. Peter van Ingwagen). The ideas in that book in relation to philosophy of the mind must be a product of its time. It’s full of assumptions and pre-conceived ideas.
And he uses the generic term “materialism” in a way that’s too specific, despite of all the different forms of materialism that exist, I’d say he seems to be more of an epiphenomenalist, or perhaps emergentist (which are just particular forms of it), but he does not seem to develop it well enough to clarify it. However the way he talks about it excludes many other forms of materialism, particularly the more extreme ones like eliminative materialism.
Personally, for a book like this one that’s meant to be an introduction (he does not go very deep), I would have first made clear the difference between dualism and monism… specially given that he seems to like the idea of including in materialism the concept of “matter” and “mind” (or “spirit” as he calls it) as two separate things, which would likely lead many to confuse materialism with a form of dualism after reading this book.
When it comes to your argument, “Ownership” is just an authority position recognized by the state as falling under that term. There’s no functional requirements or powers.
No, the executive power is a power. It does have a function… in the same way, the management/administrative obligations of a position has a function.
A society where “owners” have no actual ability to buy or sell what they “own” and who are selected by society to “own” rather than by virtue of posession aren’t owners at all.
I don’t agree with that, if I can’t sell something that does not mean I’m not its owner, it just means I will be stuck with it (unless somehow I find a way to get rid of it).
I also did not say they don’t have that ability, what I said that if the property is a means of production, the rules of the State would force them to require the approval of the State/Workers for any action related to that property. So if the State/Workers don’t agree with the operation, it would not be allowed.
This is not dissimilar to how in many countries some properties are protected by the State, even when they are privately owned. Some States will try and place laws to prevent certain practices with certain properties. Like forest/woodland and so. Sometimes you will not be allowed to do certain things with your house if the State does not consider it sensible (like how I’m not allowed to install solar panels, because for some reason my city does not want houses in my neighborhood to have anything that could make them look modern -_-U).
I hope that one day you will understand Politzer, or well, idealism and materialism, even if it isn’t through reading Politzer. Then you will understand why I said you are doing idealism.
What makes Hegel’s “idealism” an idealism is the way it assumes that reality (eg. a stone floating in space) does not really exist beyond the domain of the mind (ie. if something doesn’t involve consciousness, then according to Hegel, it does not exist). Not any social development dynamic he might postulate about how “ideas” influence anything. Pure idealism is not at all about the development of society.
In other words: there’s Hegel’s methaphysical idealism, and then Hegel’s philosophy of history and society (which is where his dialectic comes in).
All those sociocultural ideas Hegel had, and his opinions on what is it that drives socioeconomical progress, are not incompatible with even the most extreme forms of materialism (the one that’s defined by the belief that matter does exist irrespective of thought).
Politzer pretends this is not the case, because what he calls “materialism” is also not strict materialism, he toys with the idea of “mind” being a separate thing from “matter” even within his explanation of materialism. And this gets him closer to dualism, not the monist ideas subyacent in what’s commonly understood as materialism. Even in the most generous reading, he’s at most a dualist of properties (ie. an emergentist) but he does not develop his thoughts enough in this respect, his ideas could be perfectly be followed by a dualist who does not agree strictly with materialism.
Politzer’s use of “mind” and “matter” is ambiguous, because he was trying to reconcile Marxist materialism (which is essentially the complementary/opposite of Hegel’s idealism) with psychology, if you actually do break through that ambiguouty then you’ll see he’s mixing different concepts.
Materialism and Idealism, in the philosophy of mind, are not incompatible with either of the positions of either Hegel or Marx concerning philosophy of history.
In a strict materialist view, brains are machines and all within them is material and physical. Ideas don’t exist but as a form of physical electrochemical relations between the matter of the brain.
In a strict (ie. non-Hegelian) idealistic view, all physical properties, including physical things like factories, the products / good produced, etc. are real and primary in the development of society. Idealism just says that matter only exists in so far we experience it, it does not say that matter is a different thing that’s separate from ideas and that ideas are somehow important and matter is not… no. It says that matter (food, house, factories) is important and it is part of our experience, so it is part of our cosnciousness, so it is part of the realm of mind. For an idealist, matter IS mind, just the same way that for a materialist mind IS matter.
That said, I’m a strict epiphenomenalist materialist that believes in determinism and rejects the idea of free will (beyond it being just an epiphenomenological illusion in our minds), I also reject the notion that consciousness in any way or form affects reality.
I understand why you called me idealist. It’s because you were thinking about Marxist materialism and interpreted what I said (in your mind) as if it were opposed in some way to that view.
And yet, I do believe that the material act of punishing the powerful and distributing material goods efficiently and fairly what makes the most change in society… not culture/ideas per se. And in order to do that effectively you need tools that so far have not been applied in any society, nor do I see socialist societies (like China) to be steering in that direction.
You never spell anything out, it’s all semantics for you. Legitimately, your only work so far has been to change the nature of a thing by changing its name. I’m unsurprised that you don’t agree with Politzer if this is how you genuinely view concepts.
He’s definitely mixing things up, so I’m not surprised you mix them too… he’s even involving a “God”, as if this had anything to do with religion. He even talks about a “soul”…
There are theists who are hard materialists (eg. Thomas Hobbes), and there are atheists who are hard idealists (eg. Bernardo Kastrup). It’s also possible be atheist and believe in a soul (eg. Michael Humer) or theist and believe there is no soul (eg. Peter van Ingwagen). The ideas in that book in relation to philosophy of the mind must be a product of its time. It’s full of assumptions and pre-conceived ideas.
And he uses the generic term “materialism” in a way that’s too specific, despite of all the different forms of materialism that exist, I’d say he seems to be more of an epiphenomenalist, or perhaps emergentist (which are just particular forms of it), but he does not seem to develop it well enough to clarify it. However the way he talks about it excludes many other forms of materialism, particularly the more extreme ones like eliminative materialism.
Personally, for a book like this one that’s meant to be an introduction (he does not go very deep), I would have first made clear the difference between dualism and monism… specially given that he seems to like the idea of including in materialism the concept of “matter” and “mind” (or “spirit” as he calls it) as two separate things, which would likely lead many to confuse materialism with a form of dualism after reading this book.
No, the executive power is a power. It does have a function… in the same way, the management/administrative obligations of a position has a function.
I don’t agree with that, if I can’t sell something that does not mean I’m not its owner, it just means I will be stuck with it (unless somehow I find a way to get rid of it).
I also did not say they don’t have that ability, what I said that if the property is a means of production, the rules of the State would force them to require the approval of the State/Workers for any action related to that property. So if the State/Workers don’t agree with the operation, it would not be allowed.
This is not dissimilar to how in many countries some properties are protected by the State, even when they are privately owned. Some States will try and place laws to prevent certain practices with certain properties. Like forest/woodland and so. Sometimes you will not be allowed to do certain things with your house if the State does not consider it sensible (like how I’m not allowed to install solar panels, because for some reason my city does not want houses in my neighborhood to have anything that could make them look modern -_-U).
I hope that one day you will understand Politzer, or well, idealism and materialism, even if it isn’t through reading Politzer. Then you will understand why I said you are doing idealism.
What makes Hegel’s “idealism” an idealism is the way it assumes that reality (eg. a stone floating in space) does not really exist beyond the domain of the mind (ie. if something doesn’t involve consciousness, then according to Hegel, it does not exist). Not any social development dynamic he might postulate about how “ideas” influence anything. Pure idealism is not at all about the development of society.
In other words: there’s Hegel’s methaphysical idealism, and then Hegel’s philosophy of history and society (which is where his dialectic comes in).
All those sociocultural ideas Hegel had, and his opinions on what is it that drives socioeconomical progress, are not incompatible with even the most extreme forms of materialism (the one that’s defined by the belief that matter does exist irrespective of thought).
Politzer pretends this is not the case, because what he calls “materialism” is also not strict materialism, he toys with the idea of “mind” being a separate thing from “matter” even within his explanation of materialism. And this gets him closer to dualism, not the monist ideas subyacent in what’s commonly understood as materialism. Even in the most generous reading, he’s at most a dualist of properties (ie. an emergentist) but he does not develop his thoughts enough in this respect, his ideas could be perfectly be followed by a dualist who does not agree strictly with materialism.
Politzer’s use of “mind” and “matter” is ambiguous, because he was trying to reconcile Marxist materialism (which is essentially the complementary/opposite of Hegel’s idealism) with psychology, if you actually do break through that ambiguouty then you’ll see he’s mixing different concepts.
Materialism and Idealism, in the philosophy of mind, are not incompatible with either of the positions of either Hegel or Marx concerning philosophy of history.
In a strict materialist view, brains are machines and all within them is material and physical. Ideas don’t exist but as a form of physical electrochemical relations between the matter of the brain.
In a strict (ie. non-Hegelian) idealistic view, all physical properties, including physical things like factories, the products / good produced, etc. are real and primary in the development of society. Idealism just says that matter only exists in so far we experience it, it does not say that matter is a different thing that’s separate from ideas and that ideas are somehow important and matter is not… no. It says that matter (food, house, factories) is important and it is part of our experience, so it is part of our cosnciousness, so it is part of the realm of mind. For an idealist, matter IS mind, just the same way that for a materialist mind IS matter.
That said, I’m a strict epiphenomenalist materialist that believes in determinism and rejects the idea of free will (beyond it being just an epiphenomenological illusion in our minds), I also reject the notion that consciousness in any way or form affects reality.
I understand why you called me idealist. It’s because you were thinking about Marxist materialism and interpreted what I said (in your mind) as if it were opposed in some way to that view.
And yet, I do believe that the material act of punishing the powerful and distributing material goods efficiently and fairly what makes the most change in society… not culture/ideas per se. And in order to do that effectively you need tools that so far have not been applied in any society, nor do I see socialist societies (like China) to be steering in that direction.
You never spell anything out, it’s all semantics for you. Legitimately, your only work so far has been to change the nature of a thing by changing its name. I’m unsurprised that you don’t agree with Politzer if this is how you genuinely view concepts.
That’s your opinion.
I’m also not surprised you agree with “the red-headed philosopher”. Maybe read other philosophers too. It helps building up some perspective.
It’s all I’ve had to work with, as is your opinion. I don’t think we are ever going to align.
Agreed.