I hope that one day you will understand Politzer, or well, idealism and materialism, even if it isn’t through reading Politzer. Then you will understand why I said you are doing idealism.
What makes Hegel’s “idealism” an idealism is the way it assumes that matter (eg. a stone floating in space) does not really exist beyond the domain of the mind (ie. if something doesn’t involve consciousness, then according to Hegel, it does not exist). His notion that ideas drive social development is not a characteristic of traditional idealism. Pure idealism is not necessarily tied to that.
In other words: there’s Hegel’s methaphysical idealism, and then Hegel’s philosophy of history and society (which is where his dialectic comes in).
All those sociocultural ideas Hegel had, and his opinions on what is it that drives socioeconomical progress, are not incompatible with even the most extreme forms of materialism (defined by the belief that matter does exist irrespective of thought).
Politzer pretends this is not the case, because what he calls “materialism” is also not strict materialism, he toys with the idea of “mind” being a separate thing from “matter” even within his explanation of materialism. And this gets him closer to dualism, not the monist ideas subyacent in what’s commonly understood as materialism. Even in the most generous reading, he’s at most a dualist of properties (ie. an emergentist) but he does not develop his thoughts enough in this respect, his ideas could be perfectly be followed by a dualist who does not agree strictly with materialism.
Politzer’s use of “mind” and “matter” is ambiguous, because he was trying to reconcile Marxist materialism (which is essentially the complementary/opposite of Hegel’s idealism) with psychology, if you actually do break through that ambiguity then you’ll see he’s mixing different concepts.
Materialism and Idealism, in the philosophy of mind, are not incompatible with either of the positions of either Hegel or Marx concerning philosophy of history.
In a strict materialist view, brains are machines and all within them is material and physical. Ideas don’t exist but as a form of physical electrochemical relations between the matter of the brain.
In a strict (ie. non-Hegelian) idealistic view, all physical properties, including physical things like factories, the products / good produced, etc. are real and primary in the development of society. Idealism just says that matter only exists in so far we experience it, it does not say that matter is a different thing that’s separate from ideas and that ideas are somehow important and matter is not… no. It says that matter (food, house, factories) is important and it is part of our experience, and experience is part of consciousness, which is part of the realm of mind. For an idealist, matter IS mind, just the same way that for a materialist mind IS matter.
That said, I’m a strict epiphenomenalist materialist that believes in determinism and rejects the idea of free will (beyond it being just an epiphenomenological illusion in our minds), I also reject the notion that consciousness in any way or form affects reality.
I understand why you called me idealist. It’s because you were thinking about Marxist materialism and interpreted what I said (in your mind) as if it were opposed in some way to that view.
And yet, I do believe that the material act of punishing the powerful and distributing material goods efficiently and fairly what makes the most change in society… not culture/ideas per se. And in order to do that effectively you need tools that so far have not been applied in any society, nor do I see socialist societies (like China) to be steering in that direction.
I hope that one day you will understand Politzer, or well, idealism and materialism, even if it isn’t through reading Politzer. Then you will understand why I said you are doing idealism.
What makes Hegel’s “idealism” an idealism is the way it assumes that matter (eg. a stone floating in space) does not really exist beyond the domain of the mind (ie. if something doesn’t involve consciousness, then according to Hegel, it does not exist). His notion that ideas drive social development is not a characteristic of traditional idealism. Pure idealism is not necessarily tied to that.
In other words: there’s Hegel’s methaphysical idealism, and then Hegel’s philosophy of history and society (which is where his dialectic comes in).
All those sociocultural ideas Hegel had, and his opinions on what is it that drives socioeconomical progress, are not incompatible with even the most extreme forms of materialism (defined by the belief that matter does exist irrespective of thought).
Politzer pretends this is not the case, because what he calls “materialism” is also not strict materialism, he toys with the idea of “mind” being a separate thing from “matter” even within his explanation of materialism. And this gets him closer to dualism, not the monist ideas subyacent in what’s commonly understood as materialism. Even in the most generous reading, he’s at most a dualist of properties (ie. an emergentist) but he does not develop his thoughts enough in this respect, his ideas could be perfectly be followed by a dualist who does not agree strictly with materialism.
Politzer’s use of “mind” and “matter” is ambiguous, because he was trying to reconcile Marxist materialism (which is essentially the complementary/opposite of Hegel’s idealism) with psychology, if you actually do break through that ambiguity then you’ll see he’s mixing different concepts.
Materialism and Idealism, in the philosophy of mind, are not incompatible with either of the positions of either Hegel or Marx concerning philosophy of history.
In a strict materialist view, brains are machines and all within them is material and physical. Ideas don’t exist but as a form of physical electrochemical relations between the matter of the brain.
In a strict (ie. non-Hegelian) idealistic view, all physical properties, including physical things like factories, the products / good produced, etc. are real and primary in the development of society. Idealism just says that matter only exists in so far we experience it, it does not say that matter is a different thing that’s separate from ideas and that ideas are somehow important and matter is not… no. It says that matter (food, house, factories) is important and it is part of our experience, and experience is part of consciousness, which is part of the realm of mind. For an idealist, matter IS mind, just the same way that for a materialist mind IS matter.
That said, I’m a strict epiphenomenalist materialist that believes in determinism and rejects the idea of free will (beyond it being just an epiphenomenological illusion in our minds), I also reject the notion that consciousness in any way or form affects reality.
I understand why you called me idealist. It’s because you were thinking about Marxist materialism and interpreted what I said (in your mind) as if it were opposed in some way to that view.
And yet, I do believe that the material act of punishing the powerful and distributing material goods efficiently and fairly what makes the most change in society… not culture/ideas per se. And in order to do that effectively you need tools that so far have not been applied in any society, nor do I see socialist societies (like China) to be steering in that direction.