I’m not sure if you’re being serious here or not, but I too have a tux tattoo. I knew at the time that it wasn’t a unique idea, but I’ve never met anyone else who has one. There must be dozens of us.

Do people also ask you if it’s Pingu or something from club penguin?

From what I’ve read, it sounds like the update file that was causing the problems was entirely filled with zeros; the patched file was the same size but had data in it.

My entirely speculative theory is that the update file that they intended to deploy was okay (and possibly passed internal testing), but when it was being deployed to customers there was some error which caused the file to be written incorrectly (or somehow a blank dummy file was used). Meaning the original update could have been through testing but wasn’t what actually ended up being deployed to customers.

I also assume that it’s very difficult for them to conduct UAT given that a core part of their protection comes from being able to fix possible security issues before they are exploited. If they did extensive UAT prior to deploying updates, it would both slow down the speed with which they can fix possible issues (and therefore allow more time for malicious actors to exploit them), but also provide time for malicious parties to update their attacks in response to the upcoming changes, which may become public knowledge when they are released for UAT.

There’s also just an issue of scale; they apparently regularly release several updates like this per day, so I’m not sure how UAT testing could even be conducted at that pace. Granted I’ve only ever personally involved with UAT for applications that had quarterly (major) updates, so there might be ways to get it done several times a day that I’m not aware of.

None of that is to take away from the fact that this was an enormous cock up, and that whatever processes they have in place are clearly not sufficient. I completely agree that whatever they do for testing these updates has failed in a monumental way. My work was relatively unaffected by this, but I imagine there are lots of angry customers who are rightly demanding answers for how exactly this happened, and how they intend to avoid something like this happening again.

I’m not the person you responded to, but the Assistance and Access Act 2018 is probably a good place to start. Here is a page from the Aus Government about it, but the very short version is that the government can ask tech providers to assist them with building capabilities into their systems to allow the government to access data to help with the investigation of certain crimes. In some cases these will be voluntary requests, in other cases they will be requests that must be fulfilled, including asking providers to add capabilities that the government has developed.

There’s a lot more detail about it, and the government insists that they won’t ask providers to create systematic weaknesses or to decrypt communications entirely, but it’s not clear to me exactly how those ideas are actually implemented. Unfortunately, much of the process (likely the entire process) is not made public, so as far as I’m aware there aren’t any good examples of requests that the government has made and what sorts of things have or haven’t been implemented.